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Basic Choices in the Law of Auto Finance: 
Contract Versus Regulation 
Alvin C. Harrell* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It is widely thought that American society is polarized as to 
fundamental issues regarding the role of government in 
regulating private transactions.1  Such a polarization has 
historical roots,2 and it seems to be widening rather than 
contracting.  It has also been noted that this is occurring at a 
time of unprecedented long-term national prosperity,3 with 
serious economic recessions seemingly a distant memory.  This 
suggests an obvious question: what will happen to this political 
divide, and its effect on American society, in the context of the 
inevitable serious economic crisis?  Your author does not know 
the answer to that question, but the question itself suggests a 
need for society to maximize its efforts to address, illuminate, 
and, as possible, rationally reconcile its conflicting views in a 
timely manner. 
At the center of this polarization is the law, and more 
precisely for our purposes, commercial and consumer law.  A 
primary role of any legal system is to provide a mechanism for 
the peaceful resolution of private controversies.4  This function, 
 
* Robert S. Kerr, Sr. Distinguished Professor of Law, Oklahoma City University School of 
Law. 
 1 See, e.g., Tim Rutten, Fact or Opinion?  Yes, It Really Does Matter, L.A. TIMES 
(Orange County ed.), Dec. 27, 2003, at E1 (noting that this divide extends to journalism 
and positing that this may threaten the vital center that draws commercial funding to 
support our news media infrastructure). 
 2 Id.  See also JAMES GRANT, MONEY OF THE MIND: BORROWING AND LENDING IN 
AMERICA FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO MICHAEL MILKEN (First Noonday Press 1994) (1992) 
(analyzing the historical growth of borrowing and lending). 
 3 See Rutten, supra note 1, at E1. 
 4 LEGAL INSTITUTIONS TODAY: ENGLISH AND AMERICAN APPROACHES COMPARED 
32 (Harry W. Jones ed., 1977).  It is surely ironic that our modern legal system, with its 
emphasis on such things as due process, fundamental fairness, and consumer protection, 
arose from a feudal system in England designed primarily to maintain the effects of the 
Norman conquest while balancing the needs of the king against the baronial courts.  The 
Magna Carta of 1215 is merely the most famous manifestation of this reconciliation; 
notably this process, designed to provide procedures and some substantive rules for 
resolving jurisdictional disputes between the barons and the king, led ultimately to the 
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however, requires some consensus as to how such controversies 
should be resolved.  The consensus must extend to substantive as 
well as procedural law, and must be articulated by legislatures, 
courts, and lawyers in the form of widely understood and 
universally applicable principles and rules.5  This is the nature of 
commercial and consumer law.  The consensus must also be 
broad and it must serve as a legal middle ground that represents 
a workable means to facilitate common transactions.  But how 
can that be possible in a polarized profession and society?  
Whatever middle ground that exists seems inherently at risk 
when legal debates focus on the fringes of a polarized profession.6  
Thus, a central question for our time is whether the traditional 
middle ground, as it has existed in western society for hundreds 
of years, can be preserved as the basis for a broad legal 
consensus in the twenty-first century.  A determinant of this 
outcome is the basic choice between the common law system, 
particularly contract common law, and regulation as the primary 
legal basis for effecting private transactions.7 
The choice between contract and regulation implicates a 
number of other legal and policy issues, considerations, and 
choices.  Part II of this Article highlights some of these issues.  
Part III notes the impact on current issues in vehicle finance and 
 
development of the common law system.  See WILLIAM SHARP MCKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA: 
A COMMENTARY ON THE GREAT CHARTER OF KING JOHN 295 (Lawbook Exchange 2000) 
(1914). 
 5 This is, of course, a narrow concept of law, as a system of rules to govern human 
relations.  There are other broader and more philosophical directions that one can take, 
but these would change the focus of this article into an inquiry concerning the nature of 
jurisprudence.  Roscoe Pound described law in the first sense as ìthe legal order [as that 
term] is used to mean the regime of ordering human activities and adjusting human 
relations through the systematic application of the force of a politically organized society.î  
1 ROSCOE POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 13 (Lawbook Exchange 2000) (1959).  Your author will 
accept this as good enough for present purposes, and as consistent with the concept of 
ìconsumer lawî as generally understood today.  See id. at 12-14; FREDERICK H. MILLER ET 
AL., CONSUMER LAW: CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 4-5 (1998).  See also Clare Dalton, 
An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997 (1985); Patrick J. 
Kelley, A Critical Analysis of Holmesís Theory of Contract, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1681 
(2000); John E. Murray, Jr., Unconscionability: Unconscionability, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 
(1969). 
 6 See Rutten, supra note 1, at E1.  A focus on fringe issues will inevitably 
emphasize broad, philosophical differences that realistically cannot be bridged, thereby 
emphasizing the divisions between the participants.  In contrast, a debate that focuses on 
narrow, more practical questions will tend to reduce the scope of the controversy to 
matters where there is a greater opportunity for consensus.  This is not to suggest that 
any kind of debate should be limited or discouraged, but only to note that if consensus as 
to a middle ground is desired, success is more likely in the context of narrow practical 
issues as opposed to broader philosophical ones.  The common law of contracts, as 
discussed in this article, is a particularly effective mechanism for achieving precisely that 
success.  See also Alvin C. Harrell, Commentary: Common Law or Regulation ñ Which is 
Better?, 58 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. (forthcoming 2004). 
 7 Mark L. Movsesian, Two Cheers for Freedom of Contract, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1529, 1547-48 (2002) (book review). 
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the ways that alternative policy choices relate to those issues.  
Part IV is a conclusion designed to summarize the basic points 
derived from this discussion. 
It can be conceded from the outset that your author believes 
that freedom of contract is an important part of civil society.  As 
such, it should only be constrained with caution.  Regulation of 
private transactions, even in the name of consumer protection, is 
inherently a constraint on that freedom.8  That is not to say that 
regulation is always inappropriate; however, it is to say that 
regulation is not cost-free.  Like all policy decisions, the decision 
to let public institutions regulate rather than defer to the wishes 
of the parties to the transaction logically requires a realistic cost-
benefit analysis in terms of both social and individual interests.  
This Article considers some of the factors that may be 
appropriate for consideration in such analysis. 
II. POLICY CHOICES IN A POLARIZED SOCIETY 
There are some clear analytical benefits in debating these 
issues.  The current emphasis on the polarization of American 
political thought may help to present society with a set of more 
clearly articulated policy alternatives regarding the basic 
elements, practices, transactions, and remedies of commercial 
and consumer law.  Articulation of these choices may help to 
resolve or at least narrow policy differences.  The following 
discussion will consider some of these basic policy choices. 
A. Contract Versus Regulation 
The choice between freedom of contract and regulation is one 
of the most basic of all policy choices and, to a significant extent, 
will influence the other choices noted below (and vice versa).  The 
simple fact is that there are only two basic ways of determining 
the terms of private consumer transactions: 1) persons decide for 
themselves, or 2) someone else decides for them.  The choice is 
party autonomy effectuated via contract or its opposite.  The 
former is decision by private agreement, i.e., freedom of contract.  
The latter is the absence of or restrictions on choice, i.e., 
regulation of the terms or availability of the transaction by an 
external source.9 
 
 8 Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763, 
763-64 (1983). 
 9 See JAMES D. GWARTNEY & RICHARD STROUP, ECONOMICS: PRIVATE AND PUBLIC 
CHOICE 32-33 (3d ed. 1983).  Of course, consumer law is full of such restrictions.  That is 
the nature of consumer protection law in the United States today.  But that does not 
change the nature of the choice between party autonomy and regulation, or the cost of the 
latter in terms of the former.  See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 
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Regulation has an inevitable paternalistic effect since 
consumers are presumably protected from making bad decisions.  
Freedom of contract, on the other hand, includes the option to 
make bad choices.  It is unlikely that we could reliably eliminate 
bad choices without also limiting good ones.  Nonetheless, it is 
apparently human nature for us to believe that we can make 
better choices for others than they can make for themselves; 
indeed, education apparently tends to reinforce this belief and 
higher education even more so.  Thus, we may tend to assume 
that if we are well educated we can make better decisions than 
those who are not, even as to matters personal to other persons.  
Who among us would not like to assume the role of benevolent 
dictator?  So, paternalistic regulation is often an easy sale 
politically.  Its purported benefit of protection is easily promised, 
but its costs are seldom fully understood.10 
The common law, although biased towards freedom of 
contract, has always recognized a role for paternalistic oversight 
by public officials and the judiciary in order to protect against 
fraud, deception, duress, unconscionability, and incapacity.11  
Such protections, however, have generally been implemented 
through the courts on the basis of specific evidence and in limited 
circumstances rather than being imposed across-the-board by 
regulation on the basis of broad-scale presumptions that 
effectively bar whole classes of common transactions.12 
The hesitancy of the common law to broadly prohibit or 
prescribe in detail the terms of common transactions apparently 
stems partly from a recognition that regulation is inherently 
alien to freedom of contract and therefore carries a very high and 
commonly misunderstood social price.13  A basic truth that 
cannot be reasoned away is that regulation, no matter how 
minimally paternalistic it may be, takes away some freedom of 
 
LAW (4th ed. 1992) [hereinafter POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS] (examining the common 
law and regulatory approaches from an economic perspective). 
 10 The costs sometimes include the social and economic costs of litigation run 
amok.  See, e.g., Stuart Taylor Jr. & Evan Thomas, Civil Wars, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 15, 2003, 
at 43 (the headline on the cover of this issue reads ìLawsuit Hell: How Fear of Litigation 
is Paralyzing Our Professionsî); Alvin C. Harrell, Commentary: Itís a Mad, Mad, Mad, 
Mad World, 57 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 86, 95 (2003) [hereinafter Harrell, Mad World]; 
Jim Copland, Tort Law Represents a Growth Industry, THE DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Mar. 2, 
2004, at 12A.  These references are not intended as the definitive answer to the issues 
raised, only to suggest that the issue has indeed been raised. 
 11 See 2 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS ß 5.1 (2d ed. 1998); 
JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS  ßß 9-1 to 10-5 (3d ed. 
1987). 
 12 FARNSWORTH, supra note 11, ß 5.1. 
 13 See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 11, ß 1-3 (ì[T]he movement of the 
progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from Status to Contract.î) (quoting 
HENRY MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 165 (3d Am. ed. 1873)). 
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contract.14  It may be fully appropriate as to certain transactions 
such as those involving duress, fraud, or incapacity, but those 
traditional confines should not be extended without caution and 
careful consideration. 
Of course, if one does not believe that contracts can be 
products of equitable bargaining, it will be easy to lose faith in 
contract law and the related economic freedoms it protects.  
Much academic discourse has recently been dedicated to the 
notion that private consumer contracts, specifically form 
contracts, are a myth because they are often contracts of 
adhesion rather than a result of detailed negotiations.15  But this 
is something of a ìstraw man,î setting up unrealistic perfection 
as the goal and then rejecting anything less than perfect as a 
failure.  No modern society could function without form 
contracts, and most consumers do not have the legal expertise 
needed to draft a contract that would comply with todayís 
consumer protection laws. Form contracts, however, do not 
prevent consumers from regularly negotiating the important 
terms of big-ticket items (such as houses, cars, home 
improvements, employment contracts, and many services), and 
smaller-ticket items are sold in mass markets, which are not 
susceptible to individual haggling.  Both categories of 
transactions are commonly subject to advertised sale pricing, 
comparison-shopping, coupons, Internet deals, special offers, and 
other competitive practices that create marketing conditions 
somewhat equivalent to pricing negotiations. 
Of course, not everyone gets the same deal as the shrewdest 
consumer.  Each of us has negotiating strengths and weaknesses, 
greater interest and sophistication in some areas than in others 
(and hopefully a learning curve in each), as well as inherent 
variations in our personalities and tastes.  Our personalities are 
 
 14 See Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics 
and the Case for ìAsymmetric Paternalism,î 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1211-12 (2003); 
Alvin C. Harrell, Introduction: Predatory Lending, Part Three, 56 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. 
REP. 2, 57 (2002) (discussing the cost to consumers of predatory lending laws).  Of course, 
the general statement in the text applies primarily to substantive restrictions; disclosure 
requirements do not directly interfere with party autonomy.  However, even disclosure 
requirements are not cost-free, e.g., in terms of compliance costs and litigation risks.  Like 
any cost of doing business, these costs ultimately will be passed to consumers in some 
form (e.g., higher prices and/or reduced competition and/or reduced transaction 
availability), thereby pricing some consumers out of the market and interfering with 
freedom of contract in various ways.  See Benjamin Hoorn Barton, Why Do We Regulate 
Lawyers?: An Economic Analysis of the Justifications for Entry and Conduct Regulation, 
33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 429, 460 (2001). 
 15 See Edward L. Rubin, Types of Contracts, Interventions of Law, 45 WAYNE L. 
REV. 1903, 1906-07 (2000).  See generally Symposium, Consumer Protection and the 
Uniform Commercial Code, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (1997); Symposium, Reconsidering Grant 
Gilmoreís The Death of Contract, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (1995). 
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too diverse for it to be otherwise.  Thus, in a given transaction, 
some will be perceived as getting a better deal, although we will 
probably find much disagreement as to what constitutes the 
ìbestî deal in a given scenario.  All of this, however, is evidence of 
the functioning of free markets, not the contrary.16 
B. The Future of Contract Law 
By historical standards, contract law is relatively new.  
Modern contract law has its roots in the common law of sixteenth 
century England.17  Controls on private agreements, including 
essential terms such as price, have been common historically and 
have long been vigorously defended.18  Freedom of contract for 
consumers is therefore a relatively rare and modern 
phenomenon.  Political dynamics may explain why contract law 
is so recent in human history,19 and perhaps more consideration 
is needed on this subject.  Today, those of us who enjoy freedom 
of contract are likely to take it for granted, and we are also likely 
to take for granted the benefits of our economic freedom that 
come with the ability to contract.  But then again, perhaps it is 
natural for us to want to have our cake and eat it too, to want 
freedom of contract without the risks that it entails. 
Obviously, freedom of contract does not come without risks.  
Freedom of contract inherently includes the freedom to make bad 
deals and other mistakes.  We all do that everyday and we will 
generally defend our right to try again tomorrow.  It is 
appropriate for the law to make reasonable provisions to protect 
those who are unable to conduct their own transactions and to 
protect everyone from clearly abusive practices; however, 
drawing these lines is inherently difficult.20  Consistent with the 
common law, it is best to leave that task to the courts or their 
equivalent (e.g., arbitration in appropriate cases).  It should 
always be remembered that laws and regulations are a blunt and 
dangerous instrument, governed themselves by the law of 
 
 16 Eyal Zamir, The Efficiency of Paternalism, 84 VA. L. REV. 229, 254 (1998).  See 
also GWARTNEY & STROUP, supra note 9, at 38-39 (explaining how diverse consumer 
choices translate into the economic ìlawî of demand). 
 17 S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 279 (1969).  See 
also CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 11, ß 1-3. 
 18 See James L. Brown, An Argument Evaluating Price Controls on Bank Credit 
Cards in Light of Certain Reemerging Common Law Doctrines, 9 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 797, 
798 (1993). 
 19 Id. (explaining political dynamics as a popularly-based sentiment favoring price 
controls).  Your author would add a suggestion that the intricacies of contract law, and 
their relation to economic well-being, are often understood at a level of articulation by 
relatively few, including few in policy-making positions.  Thus, the implications are easily 
misunderstood. 
 20 Camerer et al., supra note 14, at 1211-12. 
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unintended consequences.21  Freedom from mistake may sound 
appealing but is unlikely to be achieved, because that protection 
can only come at some cost to party autonomy ñ a price that 
many of us probably would prefer not to pay.22 
Perhaps the most vigorous modern argument against 
contract law in consumer transactions is that it favors giant, 
sophisticated corporations instead of unsophisticated 
consumers:23 Influenced by advertising schemes that rely on 
popular emotions, consumers are often lured into merchantsí 
establishments and reportedly induced into unwittingly signing 
adhesion contracts with onerous terms that cannot be viewed as 
representing consensual transactions.24  This may seem an 
appealing characterization (who among us does not resent large 
corporations?), but more consideration is needed before reaching 
a conclusion based on this scenario. 
Like contract law itself, this argument is not new, and, 
indeed, probably had even greater force in the sixteenth century 
than it does today.  When contract law was created, consumers 
were far less sophisticated, both in absolute terms and relative to 
merchants, than they are today.  With near-universal education 
and literacy (at least in the U.S.), widespread dissemination of 
product information, and vigorous world-wide competitive forces 
at work, there have never been more opportunities for consumers 
to inform themselves and make rational choices than there are 
today.25  Moreover, the Internet and global competition have 
enhanced consumersí competitive bargaining position relative to 
merchants across a spectrum of transactions.  The playing field 
has never been so level.  That we as consumers do not make even 
greater efforts to inform ourselves and seek alternatives is 
largely a function of choice and how we wish to spend our time, 
 
 21 See David B. Spence & Lekha Gopalakrishnan, Bargaining Theory and 
Regulatory Reform: The Political Logic of Inefficient Regulation, 53 VAND. L. REV. 599, 608 
(2000). 
 22 See, e.g., Ira Carnahan, Predatory Lawmaking, FORBES, Jan. 12, 2004, at 61 
(noting the cost of predatory lending initiatives, in terms of credit availability). 
 23 This appears self-evident to so many that it is often taken as a given in much of 
the academic literature.  See, e.g., GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 104 (Ronald 
K. L. Collins ed., 2d ed. 1995) (ìIt seems apparent to the twentieth century mind . . . that 
a system in which everybody is invited to do his own thing, at whatever cost to his 
neighbor, must work ultimately to the benefit of the rich and powerful . . . .î).  Of course, 
Gilmoreís brief statement does not purport to adequately describe modern contract law, 
and, as noted below, in your authorís experience that statement is often not accurate as a 
general proposition.  See generally GWARTNEY & STROUP, supra note 9, at 461-65. 
 24 See Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in 
the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 429, 483 (2002). 
 25 The rise of the Internet should make this self-evident, but the expansion of 
federal and state disclosure requirements provides a further example.  See Camerer et al., 
supra note 14, at 1232-34. 
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rather than a lack of opportunity. 
Advertising is more sophisticated than ever and seemingly 
less subtle, but the charismatic salesperson, fast-buck artist, and 
con man have always been with us.  The gap between merchant 
and consumer, in terms of information and bargaining power, 
has apparently narrowed rather than widened.  The best 
consumer protection of all has always been the consumerís self-
interest, and unsophisticated consumers often get the better of 
larger and more experienced negotiating partners.26  There can 
be sharp practices and deception on both sides of a transaction. 
Contrary to popular belief, contract law does not necessarily 
reward large institutions or sophisticated and well-educated 
parties.  Well-educated and other successful professionals are 
notorious for making foolish investment and consumer decisions.  
This is evidenced by the list of the rich and famous that will 
appear in any high-profile investment failure or faddish 
consumer trend.  There is, in fact, often a divide between 
education and business success.  Contract law does reward 
caution and prudence, and over time most of us learn that.  Thus, 
there is a natural consumer learning curve in which young and 
unwary consumers are more likely to make mistakes, or at least 
unwise decisions, in ordering their lives.  Hopefully, they learn 
from those mistakes and ultimately govern themselves more 
prudently.  There also seems to be a generational progress in 
which children learn from their parents and grandparents.27  
 
 26 See Eric A. Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the 
Unconscionability Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom to 
Contract, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 283, 296 (1995).  By now it should be apparent to almost 
everyone that stature, resources, education, and a high income do not equate to wisdom or 
shrewdness.  Large enterprises have a long and well-documented tendency toward error, 
atrophy, stagnation, and even disaster.  Innovation and product sophistication more 
frequently are the hallmarks of individuals (including consumers) and small enterprises.  
See Gary Hamel & Lloyd Switzer, The Old Guard vs. the Vanguard, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 
2004, at A17; Gary Hamel, When Dinosaurs Mate, WALL ST. J., Jan. 22, 2004, at A12.  See 
generally GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM: A REINTERPRETATION OF 
AMERICAN HISTORY, 1900-1916 (Quadrangle Books 1967) (1963) (documenting the 
tendency of large enterprises to lose touch with their markets and suffer a declining 
market share).  The relative inflexibility of large enterprises derives in part from a need 
to standardize products and services to achieve the economics of scale necessary to justify 
the size of the enterprise.  This may result in a perception that the large enterprise has 
unfair bargaining power, due to the firmís reduced ability to accommodate nonconformity, 
and a resulting reliance on standard contract terms.  See POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, 
supra note 9, ß 4.7.  But, in fact, this lack of flexibility is an inherent and severe 
competitive disadvantage, which opens the door to more nimble competitors more willing 
to accommodate emerging trends, the demand for innovative goods and services, and 
expanding niche markets. 
 27 See Zamir, supra note 16, at 244.  Like most everything else, this will vary from 
person to person, and family to family.  See generally ROBERT T. KIYOSAKI, RICH DAD, 
POOR DAD: WHAT THE RICH TEACH THEIR KIDS ABOUT MONEY ñ THAT THE POOR AND 
MIDDLE CLASS DO NOT! (2000); THOMAS J. STANLEY & WILLIAM D. DANKO, THE 
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Those who are incompetent may need special protection, and the 
law provides such protection in a variety of ways.28  But for the 
rest of us, the freedom to develop and apply our own personal 
prudential standards, and to ascertain and implement the levels 
and types of risks that we are willing to accept in a given 
transaction, is an important part of life.  It makes it all 
worthwhile when we see prudent decisions rewarded.  For each of 
us, these risks and choices will be different.  Contract law and 
freedom of contract make it all possible and nothing in the 
twenty-first century changes this basic analysis. 
The debate over contract law will never end, nor should it.  It 
reminds us of the importance of contract law, the need to define 
reasonable legal boundaries, and the precarious nature of 
individual freedom.  The role of contract law is important to us 
all, at both the individual and societal level.  Fortunately, 
American contract law in general remains more viable than ever, 
and as a middle ground, it seems to be holding.29 
Consumer contracts and contract law are alive and well in 
the twenty-first century.  We may not always like the results, or 
even the process, but that is the nature of freedom.  How many of 
us would knowingly give up that freedom in return for 
paternalistic control by someone else?  As always, that is the 
essence of the choice between contract and regulation. 
C. State versus Federal Law 
A related choice is that between state and federal law.  The 
relationship between this choice and that discussed above does 
not seem to be widely recognized and understood, despite the 
obvious impact of the relationship on the legal profession.30  
 
MILLIONAIRE NEXT DOOR (1996).  It is unfortunate the public schools do not do a better job 
of supplementing this transfer of generational wisdom, so as to help level the playing field 
in terms of personal financial literacy.  Until an institutional effort is made in this regard, 
the results likely will continue to be uneven. 
  On the other hand, America remains a land of opportunity that rewards prudent 
behavior.  Recent information suggests, for example, that immigrants close the economic 
gap with native-born Americans and join the American middle class within about a ten-
year period.  California Here We Come, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 2004, at A16 (citing a 
University of Southern California study).  Some groups do better than others, but overall 
the effect is widespread, affecting diverse ethnic groups.  Id.  As reported in the media, 
nearly 90% of U.S. immigrants in the U.S. for twenty years or more make it into the 
middle class.  Id.  Considering the tremendous challenges faced by any immigrant, this is 
an extraordinary record of achievement, suggesting a very steep ìlearning curveî in terms 
of personal financial expertise. 
 28 See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 43A, ß 10-104 (2003). 
 29 Movsesian, supra note 7, at 1530.  See also Alvin C. Harrell, Case Note: Judge 
Understands Indirect Auto Finance, Part Two, 57 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 231, 233 
(2003) [hereinafter Harrell, Judge Understands]. 
 30 Movsesian, supra note 7, at 1542-43.  See also Amy Bizar et al., Introduction to 
the 2000 Annual Survey of Consumer Financial Services Law, 55 BUS. LAW. 1255, 1255-56 
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These are further issues that deserve attention as a policy and 
jurisprudential matter. 
State contract law, both common and statutory, is primarily 
derived from the common law.31  Federal law is largely 
regulatory, and although there are state regulations, most 
regulatory law is federal law.32  Most state regulations are 
enforced in court in accordance with the common law system; 
federal regulations are more often enforced in administrative 
actions.33  There are many exceptions to all of this, such as the 
Predatory Lending and Truth in Lending examples discussed 
below, but these merely prove the general rule. 
Consequently, the choice to address an issue or problem at 
the federal level is often a choice of administrative regulation 
over common law.  The exceptions are not unimportant, 
including, for example, the current wave of state predatory 
lending laws, which are somewhat regulatory in nature in the 
sense that they effectively bar whole classes of parties from 
voluntary transactions and mandate in detail certain contract 
terms for others.34  These state laws are also typically regulatory 
in the sense of agency oversight and enforcement, although the 
role of the courts remains an important factor consistent with the 
common law tradition.35 
Judicial remedies also are important in the federal law 
arena, as evidenced by the Truth in Lending Act (ìTILAî)36 and 
the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (ìFDCPAî)37 litigation, 
which surely must rank among the most extensive in history.38  
In the case of TILA, Federal Reserve Board (ìFRBî) regulation 
has played a significant role, providing a level of regulatory 
detail that is unheard of in the context of a common law 
 
(2000); Lynne B. Barr et al., Introduction to the 2004 Annual Survey of Consumer 
Financial Services Law: Where Do We Go From Here?, 59 BUS. LAW. (forthcoming 2004). 
 31 See Fernanda Nicola, Book Review, 44 HARV. INTíL L.J. 597, 599 (2003).  See also 
MILLER ET AL., supra note 5, at 7. 
 32 See LEGAL INSTITUTIONS TODAY, supra note 4, at 321. 
 33 Id. at 328.  See also MILLER ET AL., supra note 5, at 54-58 (describing Federal 
Trade Commission enforcement procedures, which are typical of federal agency 
processes). 
 34 See generally Donald C. Lampe, Predatory Lending Initiatives, Legislation and 
Litigation: Federal Regulation, State Law and Preemption, 56 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 
78 (2002).  Part of what makes these laws so striking is their departure from traditional 
norms.  Still, they are generally subject to some measure of judicial enforcement, in the 
common law tradition. 
 35 Id.  See generally Predatory Lending, Part Five, 57 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 
131 (2003) (part of a series describing state predatory lending statutes). 
 36 15 U.S.C. ßß 1601-1667f (2003). 
 37 15 U.S.C. ßß 1692-1692o (2003). 
 38 See RALPH J. ROHNER & FRED H. MILLER, TRUTH IN LENDING  1.01-1.05 (2000 
& Supp. 2002); Laurie A. Lucas & Alvin C. Harrell, 2003 Update on the Federal Fair Debt 
Collection Practices Act, 58 BUS. LAW. 1301, 1301 (2003). 
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structure.39  This differentiates TILA law from the typical state 
law in a way that illustrates state-federal law distinctions.  
Interestingly, much of the TILA litigation occurs in state courts 
where TILA disclosure errors are asserted as a basis for state law 
remedies.40  Although the FDCPA has no implementing 
regulation equivalent to the FRBís Regulation Z for TILA, the 
FDCPA itself is very detailed and regulatory in nature, again 
illustrating the noted distinction between state and federal law. 
Thus, when deciding on an approach to resolve social, 
economic, and legal disputes, the policy choice between state and 
federal law solutions is to some extent a choice between common 
law and administrative law mechanisms.  It is not surprising 
that the common law sometimes seems to be losing this 
competition.  Historically, the common law is something of an 
accidental exception to the natural preference of the governing 
elite for an administrative structure.41  The English common law 
courts were essentially a centralized equivalent of the medieval 
feudal system, designed to resolve private disputes at the 
periphery of the Kingís interest and authority.  The judges of the 
Kingís Bench quietly grafted the Law Merchant onto the common 
law in order to accommodate emerging practices and expand the 
jurisdiction of that court.42  Much like todayís uniform law 
 
 39 See ROHNER & MILLER, supra note 38,  1.01-1.05. 
 40 See Eugene J. Kelley, Jr. & John L. Ropiequet, Assignee Liability Under State 
Law After Jackson v. South Holland Dodge, 56 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 16, 18 (2002). 
 41 As noted briefly, supra note 4, the common law itself developed following efforts 
by the English Crown to centralize justice (and therefore administrative control) following 
the Norman Conquest.  MILSOM, supra note 17, at 1.  Yet it was the accidental aspects of 
this process, including the competition for business among the various royal courts, that 
led to replacement of the old system of feudal land tenures by a daring alternative based 
on private autonomy.  Id. at 26-50.  The result was that the tendency toward 
centralization of authority led in this instance to a decentralization of economic decision-
making, as feudal tenancies were replaced by the common law of contracts.  See id. at 271.  
As with the common law today, the process seems quite haphazard, and perhaps too 
focused on legal fictions.  As Milsom said, ìthe system was transformed without anything 
much being changed.î  Id. at 52.  But while justice was being centralized, the central 
courts were adapting to the customs and patterns of local practice.  ìIn England, then, 
proprietary justice and feudal government were in general harnessed by the royal power 
rather than opposed to it . . . .î  Id. at 6.  Together with competition between the courts, 
this created an unusual environment that encouraged the development of new theories of 
law to accommodate the needs of local practice in the context of more uniform (or 
ìcommonî) rules.  The common law was born, at a level of transaction (involving primarily 
private torts, contracts, and property disputes) largely beneath the level of interest of the 
king and his royal administrative authorities, aside from the common law courts which 
had a financial incentive to accommodate these common needs and emerging practices.  
Id. at 58-59.  For a good discussion of the role of the Law Merchant (the custom of 
merchants) as an influence in the development of the common law, see James Steven 
Rogers, The Early History of the Law of Bills and Notes: A Study of the Origins of Anglo-
American Commercial Law.  Thus, the common law system developed very differently 
from the more common administrative structures found elsewhere during the same 
period. 
 42 See, e.g., MILSOM, supra note 17, at 271-86.  See also JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, 
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process, these common law courts sought to secure their place by 
accommodating accepted customs and practices rather than 
mandating political change.  Thus, the common law and its 
derivatives, like the Uniform Commercial Code (ìUCCî), have 
always been user-friendly.43  Custom and usage, and not the 
imposition of new norms by the political elite, are their driving 
forces. 
This principle is alien to the notion of administrative law, 
which is inherently a top-down approach oriented toward 
imposition or consolidation of regulatory control and enforcement 
rather than accommodation of custom and usage.44  It is not 
surprising that the governing elite (including the administrative 
agencies themselves) prefer that approach or that an 
administrative legal structure has prevailed in most countries 
throughout most of history.45  Today, for example, the 
administrative model is predominant nearly everywhere in 
Western Europe, Russia, and at the European Union.46  In the 
United States it is present at the federal agency level.  The 
continuing vitality of the American common law model at the 
state level, however, is the most striking characteristic of 
American law: it distinguishes the U.S. from other, 
predominantly administrative legal systems. 
The contract-based state common law model is amenable to 
the development of new industries, which can often be created 
and take root before administrative structures are established to 
regulate them.47  The resulting legal flexibility has been essential 
 
JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS ß 3 (Michie Co. 3d ed. 1990) (1947); Grant Gilmore, 
Formalism and the Law of Negotiable Instruments, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 441, 446-50 
(1979). 
 43 See MURRAY, supra note 42, ß 10; Lynne B. Barr et al., Introduction to the 2002 
Annual Survey of Consumer Financial Services Law, 57 BUS. LAW. 1157, 1157 (2002). 
 44 For example, compare the mandate to liberally construe the Uniform 
Commercial Code with the typical regulatory goal of strict compliance.  U.C.C. ß 1-102 
(2002). 
 45 See JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 1-3, 133 (2d ed. 1985); 
HANS JULIUS WOLFF, ROMAN LAW: AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION 54 (1951). 
 46 Czech Republic President Vaclav Klaus recently opined as follows: ìThe enemies 
of free societies today are those who want to burden us down again with layer upon layer 
of regulations.  We had that in communist times.  But now if you look at all the new rules 
and regulations of (European Union) membership, layered bureaucracy is staging a 
comeback.î  THE OKLAHOMAN, Jan. 5, 2004, at 10A. 
 47 It should be self-evident that heavily-regulated industries tend to be 
concentrated among a relatively small number of competitors, and to be somewhat less 
innovative than unregulated industries.  This tendency appears to be inherent in the 
concept of comprehensive regulation.  See GWARTNEY & STROUP, supra note 9, at 480-83; 
GEORGE J. STIGLER, Can Regulatory Agencies Protect the Consumer?, in THE CITIZEN AND 
THE STATE: ESSAYS ON REGULATION 178, 181 (1975); Paul H. Weaver, Regulation, Social 
Policy, and Class Conflict, 50 PUB. INT. 45, 47-50 (1978).  In contrast, rapidly growing, 
innovating, and evolving industries often tend to be those with a relatively low level of 
regulation. 
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to economic growth and innovation since the beginning of the 
industrial revolution, and it is replicated to some extent today 
everywhere that strong economic growth exists.  Industries that 
are heavily regulated through a central administrative structure, 
e.g., a federal agency, as opposed to being governed by more 
decentralized common law principles and institutions, tend to be 
dominated by large, stable entities with close relationships to the 
regulatory agency.  This distinction is evident to some extent 
even within various industries.  It is no accident, for example, 
that national banks tend to be fewer and larger than state-
chartered banks.48  Restaurants are governed largely by state 
and local law and are even more diverse.  This seems to be an 
inherent consequence of the choice between state and federal 
law. 
There are similar implications for the legal profession.  A 
decentralized state law system will likely foster and support a 
large number of small, local law firms with relatively low levels 
of legal fees.  A federal law issue is more likely to require the 
services of one of a small number of national law firms with a 
close relationship to the federal agency whose interpretations of 
its own regulations will be dispositive of many matters.  The 
legal fees are likely to be much higher and a centralization of 
clients, legal authority, and rules will result.  A legal and 
business environment that is more suitable to the operation of 
large nationwide commercial enterprises is created; smaller, local 
enterprises are unable to successfully comply with the usual 
stream of regulatory requirements.  A trend that encourages 
further centralization of commerce, law, and legal practice is 
reinforced.49 
Thus, a choice between state and federal law solutions to 
some extent is also a choice between the common law and 
administrative law, between contract law and regulation, 
between small and large enterprises, and between local versus 
national law firms.  While this observation is not without 
numerous exceptions, and is certainly not dispositive as to which 
approach is the better one with regard to a particular issue, these 
 
 48 State-chartered banks comprise well over half of the banks in the United States, 
including two-thirds of the new charters in recent years, but have just over 40% of total 
U.S. banking assets.  Joseph A. Smith, Jr., Federal and State Regulation of Financial 
Services: Competition and the Search for Comity, 57 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 131, 131 
(2003). 
 49 As noted, this is often favored by larger enterprises.  See, e.g., Joseph B. 
Treaster, Insurers Want One Regulator Instead of 50, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2003, at C1.  ìIf 
you freeze the system [through regulation] you will lose its thrust toward progress.  But 
in many ways, GMís life will be easier.  So donít look to big business for unequivocal 
defenses of capitalism.  We guess thatís up to the folks at XYZ Bumperlight Lens.î  Robert 
L. Bartley, A Bartley Sampler, WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 2003, at A18. 
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factors deserve attention in the matrix of policy elements being 
considered.50 
D. Private Versus Public Remedies: Litigation or 
Administrative Enforcement? 
The choice between private and public remedies is one that 
many policy advocates will reject as unnecessary ñ the simple 
answer is to permit both.  Perhaps in most consumer law 
contexts that is indeed the case.  Many, though not all, federal 
consumer laws specifically provide for both private and public 
remedies, and most state consumer protection laws also have a 
mixture of such remedies.  Still, there are differences and choices 
as to these issues that should be noted. 
For various reasons, state law remedies, including 
administrative remedies, seem to be enforced primarily through 
litigation, while federal law remedies are more heavily enforced 
through administrative action.51  Again, this is not universal and 
there are many exceptions, including state administrative 
enforcement procedures and the TILA and FDCPA litigation as 
noted earlier.  Even so, TILAís greatest impact today is in state 
court litigation, where TILA disclosure errors are often asserted 
as a basis for state law claims.52  At the federal level, public 
enforcement actions in administrative law courts are more 
prevalent.  Private FDCPA cases are necessarily brought in 
federal court, so this is an example where the absence of an 
agency authorized to implement and enforce regulations has 
created a more common law-like approach, with an emphasis on 
private statutory remedies.53  But many other examples 
illustrate this basic point: Federal Trade Commission (ìFTCî) 
enforcement of rules governing fraud and deception in 
advertising;54 federal banking agency enforcement of regulations 
such as the Community Reinvestment Act (ìCRAî)55 and Home 
 
 50 As noted by Professor Lawrence Friedman: ì[T]he law of contract concerns and 
provides liberal support for the residue of economic behavior left unregulated (the free 
market). . . .î  GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT, supra note 23, at 7 (quoting 
LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA 20-24 (1965)). 
 51 For example, many state consumer law administrative remedies are enforced by 
the state attorney general, who does not maintain a separate judicial system and must 
pursue litigation in state court to enforce public administrative remedies.  In contrast, 
many federal administrative agencies operate their own systems of administrative law 
courts. 
 52 A classic example is the assignee litigation.  See Kelley & Ropiequet, supra note 
40, at 18. 
 53 The detailed and yet ambiguous nature of the FDCPA (together with statutory 
damages for technical errors and prevailing party attorney fees for even harmless errors) 
has created a fertile field for such litigation. 
 54 See MILLER ET AL., supra note 5, at 53-64. 
 55 Community Reinvestment Act and Interstate Deposit Production Regulations, 
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Mortgage Disclosure Act (ìHMDAî);56 the Department of Justice 
Fair Lending settlements of the 1990s;57 recent FTC privacy law 
enforcement actions;58 and money-laundering enforcement 
actions.59  In each of these areas of federal law, public 
enforcement has exceeded the volume of private litigation.  On 
the other hand, in traditional areas of state law (such as fraud 
and deception in the negotiation of consumer transactions, 
breach of contract, revocation of acceptance, unfair and deceptive 
acts and practices) the level of public enforcement, while 
significant, is dwarfed by the volume of private litigation.60 
This phenomenon is partly explained by plaintiffís lawyersí 
preference for state over federal courts.61  It is also explained by 
the fact that some federal rules (such as the FTC Act Section 562 
and the CRA), unlike most state laws, do not provide a private 
right of action.63  There are examples where an ambiguous or 
difficult federal rule has created a compliance nightmare that 
generates inevitable federal litigation.  Such is the case with the 
FDCPA and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974 
(ìRESPAî).64  But even TILA, the granddaddy of federal 
consumer laws, probably generates more state than federal 
litigation.65  So the basic point remains valid: state law remedies 
are enforced primarily through private litigation, while federal 
 
12 C.F.R. ßß 25.11-25.65 (2003).  See, e.g., Joseph J. Norton, ìFair Lendingî Requirements: 
The Intervention of a Governmental Social Agenda into Bank Supervision and Regulation, 
49 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 17 (1995) (discussing the CRA); Paul H. Schieber, Decatur 
Federal and Its Five (So Far) Progeny: U.S. Department of Justice Fair Lending 
Settlements, 49 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 68 (1995) (discussing the CRA and fair lending). 
 56 12 U.S.C. ßß 2801-2809 (2001).  See, e.g., Jacqueline S. Akins, Impact of the 
Regulation C Revisions, 56 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 289 (2002). 
 57 See Norton, supra note 55, at 23; Schieber, supra note 55, at 68. 
 58 See Anthony Rollo, The New New Litigation Thing: Consumer Privacy, in 
CONSUMER FINANCIAL PRIVACY: COMPLYING WITH THE GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY ACT AND 
THE FINAL RULES (2000), reprinted in 1 CONSUMER FIN. SERVICES LITIG. 975, 988-89 
(2001).  See generally Symposium on Privacy, 55 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 4 (2001). 
 59 See, e.g., Gary L. Betow & Christopher B. Woods, Overview of the USA 
PATRIOT Act, 56 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 332, 334 (2002); Jeffrey P. Taft & Christina 
A. LaVera, The Changing Landscape of Federal Money Laundering Laws: An Overview of 
the USA PATRIOT Act and Related Developments, 57 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 109 
(2003). 
 60 See, e.g., Harrell, Judge Understands, supra note 29, at 231; Robert M. 
Jaworski, Subprime Lending Under Siege in the CourtsñA Summary of Illustrative Cases, 
55 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 70 (2001); David E. Worsley, Fair Credit Reporting Cases 
Illustrate Risks for Credit Reporting Agencies, Creditors, and Lawyers, 56 CONSUMER FIN. 
L.Q. REP. 68, 69 (2002). 
 61 See, e.g., Kelley & Ropiequet, supra note 40, at 24. 
 62 The Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. ß 45 (1991). 
 63 MILLER ET AL., supra note 5, at 45-46. 
 64 12 U.S.C. ßß 2601-2617 (2001).  See also Marsha L. Williams, Update on RESPA 
Issues and Developments, 56 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 4, 4 (2002). 
 65 See, e.g., Kelley & Ropiequet, supra note 40, at 20-21 (illustrating a preference of 
private plaintiffs for state court litigation, even as to enforcement of rights created by a 
federal statute). 
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rules are somewhat more prone to public administrative 
enforcement. 
E. Implications 
So it seems clear that a policy choice between state and 
federal law is often a choice between private and public remedies, 
as well as a choice between contract law and regulation; and a 
federal law solution is often a choice of administrative law over 
common law mechanisms.  All of this may create a mixed 
message for partisans of the industry and the plaintiffsí bar, and 
make some strange political bedfellows.  Large enterprises, 
national law firms, and consumer groups with a preference for 
centralized administrative authority over contract law may favor 
federal law solutions at the expense of local attorneys, small 
companies, and private remedies.  Local law firms and legal 
services lawyers, as well as smaller commercial enterprises less 
able to bear the burdens of a complex federal regulatory 
structure, may favor a state common law approach with an 
emphasis on private remedies in state court (although the latter 
parties may be less cognizant of the implications of the choices 
being made).66 
Since in many cases the ultimate choice between federal 
regulation and state common law will be made at the federal 
level, largely at the behest of those with a preference for federal 
administrative law, it is not surprising that our recent history is 
a record of expanding the jurisdiction and remedies provided by 
federal administrative law at the expense of state courts and the 
common law.67  What is surprising is that private state law 
litigation, at the local level, nevertheless remains a dominant 
part of the landscape of consumer protection law.68  This is surely 
a testament to the viability of the common law system and 
should provide a continuing lesson for policy makers and 
advocates on both sides of the consumer law policy debates. 
III. ISSUES IN AUTO FINANCE 
Auto sales finance is a very important part of the consumer 
credit marketplace.  There is no question that both new and used 
auto sales generate numerous consumer complaints.69  This 
 
 66 See, e.g., Bartley, supra note 49, at A18. 
 67 See, e.g., Jathon Sapsford, Critics Cry Foul Over New Rules on Bank Review, 
WALL ST. J., Jan. 8, 2004, at C1.  See also Lampe, supra note 34, at 78, 81; Smith, supra 
note 48, at 131. 
 68 See, e.g., MILLER ET AL., supra note 5, at 7. 
 69 See, e.g., PUBLIC CITIZEN, RIP-OFF NATION: AUTO DEALERSí SWINDLING OF 
AMERICA (2003), at http://www.citizen.org/autosafety/dealerscam/. 
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discussion will note some of the more common issues and 
consider alternative solutions pursuant to the policy choices 
noted in Part II above. 
A. Spot Delivery 
While not a legal term of art, ìspot deliveryî generally refers 
to the sale of a vehicle on credit (a ìcredit saleî) prior to finalizing 
the credit terms.70  An alternative scenario (not a spot delivery) is 
where the auto dealer contacts a creditor that purchases retail 
installment sales contracts (a ìRISCî) to investigate the likely 
prospects of a secondary sale of the vehicle buyerís RISC before 
the RISC is executed between the vehicle buyer and the auto 
dealer.71  In this latter scenario, the dealer may feel comfortable 
finalizing the credit terms with the vehicle buyer at the time the 
vehicle is delivered because the dealer is comfortable that the 
vehicle buyerís RISC can be sold to a contract purchaser in a 
secondary transaction. 
In contrast, in a ìspot deliveryî scenario the auto dealer may 
not feel comfortable in setting the final credit terms with the 
vehicle buyer due to uncertainty about the possibility of a 
secondary sale of the RISC.72  Thus, a spot delivery involves 
delivery of the vehicle on the spot, before the credit terms of the 
RISC have been established.  There are obvious risks on both 
sides of these transactions. 
There are also advantages to both parties in a spot delivery.  
The vehicle buyer gets immediate delivery of the vehicle, which 
may be important or at least highly desirable to an eager buyer.  
The auto dealer gets to effectuate a sale that might otherwise be 
lost if the potential buyer leaves the lot without the vehicle.  
Thus, spot delivery allows both parties to enter the sales 
transaction in a timely manner, even in the absence of final 
credit arrangements.  This may be essential for transactions such 
as weekend sales when some potential contract purchasers are 
not open for business. 
Spot delivery is clearly not illegal.  Should it be?  It carries 
the potential for deceptive (and thus illegal) practices on both 
 
 70 See generally Adam G. Taub, Yo-Yo Sales: The Predatory Practice of 
Unscrupulous Car Dealers, CONSUMER L. NEWSL. (St. Bar of Mich. Consumer L. Sec.), 
Lansing, Mich., Aug. 2003, at 3, available at http://www.michbar.org/consumer/. 
 71 See JOHN O. HONNOLD ET AL., CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON SECURITY 
INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 112-22 (2d ed. 1992). 
 72 See, e.g., Baggett v. Crown Auto. Group, Inc., No. 01-A-01-9110-CV00401, 1992 
WL 108710, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 22, 1992).  See also Eugene J. Kelley, Jr. et al., 
APR Splits: Still Legal After All These Years, 56 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 296, 297-99 
(2002) [hereinafter Kelley et al., APR Splits] (discussing Baggett). 
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sides.  For example, the incomplete nature of a spot delivery 
transaction means that the vehicle buyer may be susceptible to 
fraudulent representations by the dealer about credit terms 
when later finalizing the transaction.73  With the vehicle buyer in 
possession of the vehicle (and possibly having proudly shown it to 
friends and relatives) and any trade-in or down payment in the 
possession of the dealer, the vehicle buyer may feel constrained 
to accept whatever credit terms the dealer later claims to be 
necessary.  Of course, this could work both ways: the vehicle 
buyer has a right to revoke acceptance of the vehicle or otherwise 
to reject or rescind the incomplete sales contract if the credit 
terms prove to be unsatisfactory.74  This allows the vehicle buyer 
to demand cancellation of the sale and return of any down 
payment or trade-in while holding the vehicle delivered by the 
dealer as security for any claims.  The consumer has considerable 
negotiating leverage in these circumstances.  So, both parties 
retain some inherent bargaining power in a spot delivery 
scenario. 
Of course, many consumers may be unaware of their 
remedies.75  This is a seemingly unavoidable condition, at least 
until all consumers enroll in a consumer law seminar.  More 
consumer awareness and education would be beneficial and is 
always needed.  Nevertheless, consumers presumably know they 
can contact a lawyer or simply refuse to go forward if they are 
uncomfortable about a pending transaction.  These cases are 
handled constantly and routinely and at reasonable cost by 
many, mostly small, law firms and legal services offices all 
around the country.76  The common law, UCC, and customary 
 
 73 Baggett, 1992 WL 108710, at *7.  See also Kathleen E. Keest, Recent 
Developments in Automobile Lending: Hot Spots, 52 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 287, 292 
(1998) [hereinafter Keest, Recent Developments]. 
 74 There is some dispute over whether spot delivery constitutes a contract with a 
condition subsequent or a condition precedent.  This may depend on the facts and the 
contract terms, but either way the consumer should have a right to reject the deal.  See, 
e.g., Peter G. Dillon & Alvin C. Harrell, Revocation of Acceptance Under UCC Section 2-
608 as a Remedy in a Consumer Sales Transaction Involving Conflicting Oral Quality 
Representations and Standardized Quality Warranty Disclaimer Language, 53 CONSUMER 
FIN. L.Q. REP. 330, 330-31, 338 (1999). 
 75 Perhaps surprisingly, given the resources being devoted to consumer protection, 
issues relating to consumer education and debt counseling remain largely unaddressed in 
our society.  See, e.g., Dale Ellis, Introduction to the Symposium: Why Consumer 
Bankruptcies Will Continue Like a Plague ñ Structural Forces that Institutionalize 
Bankruptcy as a Way of Life in America, 47 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 391, 391-92 (1993); 
Karen Gross, Making Sense of Cents: Concrete Ways to Improve Financial Literacy Skills, 
54 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 233, 233 (2000); Karen Gross, Preliminary Proposal on 
Debtor Education Program Options, 51 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 23, 23-24 (1997); David 
A. Lander, Snapshot of an Industry in Turmoil: The Plight of Consumer Debt Counseling, 
54 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 330, 330-31 (2000). 
 76 See, e.g., Symposium: Consumer Litigation, 52 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 287 
(1998) (illustrating the range of remedies available in such cases). 
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consumer protection remedies seem quite adequate in this 
context, and are easy for general jurisdiction courts to 
understand and apply.  This is the common law in action, and 
thus far the basic common law and UCC remedies have proved 
more effective in providing a practical consumer remedy in these 
scenarios than the most elegant federal statute or regulation.77 
Would a more onerous regulatory regime be more effective?  
Regulatory advocates may prefer detailed rules prescribing (or 
prohibiting) certain contract terms and practices.78  Spot delivery 
could be flatly prohibited or made effectively so by onerous 
restrictions like those in the Home Owners Equity Protection Act 
(ìHOEPAî)79 and some state predatory lending statutes.  This, 
however, would interfere with millions of desirable consumer 
purchase transactions.  It would also prescribe a competitive 
advantage for very large national dealers and creditors who can 
create in-house sales and financing affiliates, around-the-clock 
staffing and operations, or automated processing systems.  This 
would mean fewer independent auto dealers, less competition, 
and probably higher prices for consumers. 
The usual political compromise would be to have spot 
delivery permitted but tightly regulated.  This would 
nevertheless result in the same outcome as described above: 
smaller, local dealers and creditors would be less able to devote 
the resources necessary for regulatory compliance.  Competition 
would be reduced and higher prices would result.  The 
advantages of spot delivery would be lost to many dealers and 
consumers.  Moreover, the sheer volume of these transactions 
means that effective enforcement would be difficult or even 
impossible unless we are willing to accept some kind of an 
expanded economic police mechanism.80  The likely result is that 
honest small dealers and creditors would be driven from the 
market by the regulatory costs, risks, and compliance burdens, 
while fly-by-night operators would have little to lose and little 
fear of effective enforcement to impede their abusive operations.  
Larger dealers would gain market share and raise prices (or 
 
 77 See Kelley & Ropiequet, supra note 40, at 20-24. 
 78 See Lampe, supra note 34, at 82; Sapsford, supra note 67, at C1. 
 79 Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 
103-325, ßß 151-58, 108 Stat. 2190-2198 (1994) (codified as amended in 15 U.S.C. ßß 1601-
1604 and scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 80 While some might welcome such an expansion, it is not an easy solution.  The 
experience of the FTC is instructive: Despite a large budget, its limited resources mean 
that only a relatively small number of enforcement actions can be maintained each year, 
necessarily leaving most remedies to the private sector.  See, e.g., Lawrence A. Young, 
Identity Theft: Who Are You When Your Identity is Gone, Mrs. Jones?, 57 CONSUMER FIN. 
L.Q. REP. 88 (2003); Lawrence A. Young, The Landscape of Privacy, 55 CONSUMER FIN. 
L.Q. REP. 4 (2001). 
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other fees) to compensate for the compliance risks and costs.  
Overall the cost to consumers would rise significantly and 
transaction availability would be reduced.  The paucity and cost 
of HOEPA transactions and enforcement serves to illustrate the 
point.81  It is reasonable to question whether the benefits would 
offset these costs. 
It is instructive that after more than thirty years of 
increasingly active regulation of consumer credit transactions, 
the simple common law (and UCC) remedies are still the most 
viable in the vast majority of consumer vehicle sales and finance 
cases.82  Advocates of regulation are still seeking a magic 
regulatory bullet by claiming that additional and more detailed 
regulation is needed.  But this always comes at a cost: reduced 
competition results in higher costs to consumers and restricted 
transaction availability.  Through it all, the common law 
remedies have remained the most effective.  Spot delivery merely 
illustrates this basic point. 
B. Fraud and Deception, Unequal Bargaining Power, Adhesion 
Contracts 
Fraud and deception come in endless varieties.  In fact, the 
problems with spot delivery are just one variation.  Other 
varieties include misrepresentation as to the condition of the 
vehicle,83 selling a used car as new,84 insurance packing,85 forgery 
and alteration of contracts,86 and misrepresenting to the 
consumer that the dealer will help the consumer get the best 
financing available.87 
Much of the analysis above in Part III, Section A regarding 
spot delivery also applies to this discussion.  It is often alleged 
that the consumer is essentially helpless in these cases; the 
 
 81 See Alvin C. Harrell, Commentary: Conflicting Perspectives on ìPredatory 
Lending,î 56 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 134, 230, 240 (2002). 
 82 See Dillon & Harrell, supra note 74. 
 83 See, e.g., Murray v. D & J Motor Co., 958 P.2d 823, 826-27 (Okla. Civ. App. 1998) 
(holding that revocation of acceptance for false description of vehicle was permissible 
despite disclaimer of all warranties).  See also Dillon & Harrell, supra note 74, at 330-31. 
 84 See, e.g., Rubio v. Bob Crow Chrysler-Plymouth-Dodge, Inc., 145 F. Supp. 2d 
1248, 1248-49 (D.N.M. 2001). 
 85 See, e.g., Anthony Rollo, A Primer on Consumer Credit Insurance, 54 CONSUMER 
FIN. L.Q. REP. 52, 59-63 (2000).  This includes abuses in the ìforced-placementî of 
collateral protection insurance.  See, e.g., Mark E. Dapier et al., Collateral Protection 
Insurance: Legislatures to the Rescue, 55 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 115, 115-16 (2001). 
 86 See, e.g., Baggett v. Crown Auto. Group, Inc., No. 01-A-01-9110-CV00401, 1992 
WL 108710, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 22, 1992).  See also Kelley et al., APR Splits, supra 
note 72, at 297. 
 87 See Fairman v. Schaumburg Toyota, Inc., No. 94 C 5745, 1996 WL 392224, at *1 
(N.D. Ill. July 10, 1996); Bramlett v. Adamson Ford, Inc., 717 So. 2d 772, 775 (Ala. Civ. 
App. 1996). 
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consumer is sometimes said to be totally at the mercy of an 
unscrupulous auto dealer who has greater knowledge and 
bargaining power and uses adhesion contracts.  Sometimes this 
is all true, although it is not limited to auto transactions.  ìBuyer 
bewareî remains valuable advice in a variety of contexts, that 
most of us learn to respect more and more as we gain knowledge 
and experience.  As always, more consumer awareness and 
education (and prudence) would be desirable.  But consumer 
disadvantages can be overstated, and the common law provides a 
surprisingly level playing field and ample remedies in these 
transactions. 
The economic leverage is often with the consumer.  The auto 
dealer frequently needs to make the sale more than the consumer 
needs to buy the auto.  The dealer has spent heavily on 
advertising to attract the consumer to the dealership and may 
need the sale desperately in order to meet volume quotas and 
financial commitments.  Most vehicle buyers are not that 
desperate; most can drive their old cars a little longer if the 
proposed sale does not suit them.  In short, in many cases it is 
easier for the consumer to walk away than it is for the dealer.  
There are always plenty of other eager dealers if the present one 
does not make appropriate concessions.  The bargaining power 
advantage is often with the consumer, not the dealer. 
True, the RISC is a standard-form adhesion contract.  But 
this is largely true for the dealer as well as the consumer.  RISC 
forms are essentially mandated by secondary market 
considerations, federal regulations, and consumer credit law 
requirements, which require them to meet uniform standards.88  
These standards are designed to be fair and consistent.  The 
standard forms contain no surprises, and the most important 
terms (price, annual percentage rate, term to maturity, monthly 
payment, etc.) are fully negotiable and are widely known to be 
negotiable.89  The dealerís control over these forms is very 
 
 88 See W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of 
Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 550 (1971); James J. White, Form Contracts 
Under Revised Article 2, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 315, 315 (1997). 
 89 See Robert A. Cook, A Primer on Closed-End Credit Transactions Under the 
Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z, 53 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 315, 318-20 (1999) 
[hereinafter Cook, Closed-End Credit Transactions] (summarizing the mandatory 
disclosures for credit transactions).  These disclosures make it difficult for any consumer 
to be unaware of the basic terms of the transaction.  But see DAVID E. NORDSTROM, INSIDE 
SECRETS OF AUTO DEALERS 31-41 (1995) (describing the ìtricks of the tradeî); Keest, 
Recent Developments, supra note 73, at 288-90; Ralph J. Rohner, Whither Truth in 
Lending?, 50 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 114 (1996) (discussing problems with the current 
disclosure regime).  See also Robert A. Cook, The Truth in Lending ActñA Review in Light 
of its Original Purpose, 49 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 357 (1995); Kathleen E. Keest, 
Whither Now?  Truth in Lending in TransitionñAgain, 49 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 360 
(1995) [hereinafter Keest, Whither Now?].  Perhaps for some consumers, disclosure will 
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limited.  The problems in consumer credit transactions generally 
do not arise from the use of common or standardized forms.90 
Thus, contrary to common allegations, the bargaining 
advantage is often with the consumer.  Adhesion contracts are 
essential and their terms normally fair (the risk of the contrary is 
simply too great), and fraud and deception are inherently 
dangerous (and foolish) for a dealer or creditor because the 
consumer remedies are so effective.  Exceptions will never be 
eliminated and remain too prevalent, but the numbers appear to 
be relatively small considering the huge volume of these 
transactions.  The exceptions, although always unfortunate, are 
subject to effective common law remedies.  Again, the common 
law system seems to be working quite well. 
Would a system of detailed regulation work better?  It is 
difficult to see how any regulatory system could entirely prevent 
fraud and deception in this volume of private transactions.  
Effective private remedies for exceptional cases, such as those 
provided by the common law and the UCC, are preferable.  They 
do not interfere with the vast majority of desirable transactions.  
Onerous penalties and detailed regulations would be more likely 
to discourage legitimate competition and increase consumer 
prices than to effectively discourage the inevitable bad actors. 
There will always be legitimate disputes over contract terms, 
product quality, and the like.  No one has devised a better way to 
resolve them other than by private arbitration or litigation as a 
means to effectuate common law and related UCC remedies.  The 
infinite variety of these disputes suggests that no system of 
detailed regulation can ever contemplate and prevent them all.  
Efforts to do so are likely to devolve into such complexity and 
create so many compliance burdens as to restrict legitimate 
transaction availability and increase consumer costs without 
effectively combating fraud.  Again, the HOEPA and the 
predatory lending experience are instructive.91 
Thus, an auto dealerís greater experience and inherent 
command of the sales process is offset to some extent by the 
 
never be enough.  See, e.g., Richard E. Speidel, Unconscionability, Assent and Consumer 
Protection, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 359, 364 (1970) (ìThere is little evidence that disclosure 
and informed shopping can be relied upon to put competitive pressure on professionals 
operating in low income areas.î).  But this problem has proved resistant to solutions that 
are compatible with the basic personal freedoms traditionally valued in this country.  
Your author would quarrel with the notion that low-income consumers are inherently 
incapable of attending to their own financial affairs.  See supra note 27 and accompanying 
text. 
 90 Based on a review of the case law, most serious problems derive from alleged 
abuses relating to negotiated terms.  See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text. 
 91 See, e.g., Lampe, supra note 34. 
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vehicle buyerís inherent bargaining power, his or her natural 
focus on the important terms of the transaction (which are 
commonly known by all parties to be negotiable), and the general 
fairness of form contracts.  Exceptions are subject to very 
effective and affordable state law remedies in arbitration or state 
court, with thousands of lawyers in every state eager to handle 
the cases.  It all works very well to facilitate many millions of 
satisfactory transactions every year and to adequately handle the 
abusive exceptions.  There is no significant evidence that a 
detailed regulatory regime could do any better (or even as well).92 
C. Assignee Issues 
Much of the recent high-profile litigation has centered on 
efforts to hold RISC assignees (contract purchasers) liable for 
violations of law by assignor auto dealers.93  This by itself may be 
sufficient to raise modest suspicions that in some of the class 
action cases the plaintiffsí lawyers are more interested in 
pursuing deep pockets for attorney fees than in providing 
remedies for specific clients.94  Of course these goals (attorney 
fees and client relief) are not mutually exclusive, and any 
suspicion about motives is not necessarily inconsistent with the 
recognition that many class actions are worthwhile because they 
play a valuable role in our legal system.95  Class actions are 
clearly needed in some cases but can be abusive in others.96  It is 
up to the courts to develop standards for distinguishing between 
the two in a consistent manner (an effort that remains a work in 
progress). 
The efforts to pursue contract purchasers on the basis of auto 
dealer violations reflect both the problems and the progress in 
this area of law.  The cases have largely rejected assignee 
liability for dealer actions absent some participation in or 
knowledge of the dealerís wrongdoing.97  Some truly creative 
theories attacking assignees have yielded large rewards for 
plaintiffsí lawyers,98 which sustain the hopes for a lawyerís 
 
 92 That does not mean that we cannot make it better, but that is easier said than 
done.  See, e.g., Keest, Whither Now?, supra note 89, at 360; Rohner, supra note 89, at 
118. 
 93 See, e.g., Mark E. Dapier et al., Assignee Liability Under the TILA: Is the 
Conduit Theory Really Dead?, 54 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 242, 242 (2000); Kelley & 
Ropiequet, supra note 40. 
 94 See Harrell, Mad World, supra note 10, at 114. 
 95 See MILLER ET AL., supra note 5, at 28-36; Thomas M. Byrne, Demystifying Class 
Certification, 54 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 277 (2000). 
 96 See generally Eugene J. Kelley, Jr. et al., Offers of Judgment in Class Action 
Cases: Do Defendants Have a Secret Weapon?, 54 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 283 (2000). 
 97 See, e.g., Kelley & Ropiequet, supra note 40, at 20. 
 98 See, e.g., Anne P. Fortney & James Chareq, Auto Finance Litigation Under the 
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windfall.  Mostly, however, the courts have handled these 
matters well, and continuing efforts to reverse this trend seem 
likely to prove futile.  Thus, there is something of a divide 
between lawyers claiming large fees for settling questionable 
class action mega-suits and the local practitioners who help 
needy individual consumers resolve ordinary contract disputes.  
Often the efforts of the former are directed at assignees and 
those of the latter at dealers, which makes this a potential point 
of distinction between two very different types of consumer 
advocacy. 
Surely, this cannot be taken to say that all suits against 
assignees are frivolous.  But by now it should be clear that 
assignees generally are not liable for wrongdoing by the assignor 
outside certain specified legal boundaries under the common 
law,99 the UCC,100 and federal consumer laws.101  Plaintiffsí 
lawyers who bring abusive class actions against deep-pocket 
defendants on theories without legal merit (perhaps hoping to 
settle for an attorney fee payment less than the defendantís 
litigation costs or hoping for a sympathetic judge or a jury that 
misunderstands the law, and seeking no significant relief for the 
consumer class members) do not deserve to be viewed chiefly as 
champions of the poor.  Among other things, the litigation costs 
and risks for defendants in these cases have significantly raised 
the cost of doing business in this country and have had adverse 
consequences for all consumers, especially the poor.102  One need 
not disfavor class action litigation in order to note these issues. 
Through it all, the common law of assignment has remained 
paramount and is actually reflected quite well in federal 
 
Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 57 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 227, 228 (2003). 
 99 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 11, ß 11.7; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 
ß 336 (1979). 
 100 See U.C.C. ßß 3-302:1, 3-305, 9-330 to 9-332, 9-403 to 9-405 (2003). 
 101 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. ß 1641(a) (1998); 12 C.F.R. ß 202.2(l) (2003) (codifying the 
Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ìECOAî) and Regulation B ìmultiple creditor ruleî); 16 
C.F.R. ßß 433.1-433.3 (2003) (codifying the FTC ìholder in due course ruleî).  The same is 
true under state consumer protection laws.  See, e.g., Harrell, Judge Understands, supra 
note 29, at 231-32.  But see Fortney & Chareq, supra note 98 (discussing assignee liability 
in ECOA litigation). 
 102 Poor consumers represent higher default and litigation risks and 
disproportionately pay more to cover those risks.  As these risks increase, so do consumer 
costs.  See also Harrell, Mad World, supra note 10, at 114, 134 (noting the adverse 
competitive effects of the U.S. litigation explosion on the cost of doing business); Is Free 
Trade Immoral?, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 2004, at A10 (ì[T]he primary competitive challenge 
facing manufacturers was not competition from cheaper foreign workers, but the extra 
cost of doing business in the U.S.  The costs contributing to the loss of jobs were high 
corporate tax rates, mandated employee benefits, tort litigation, regulatory compliance 
and energy.î).  See also Holman W. Jenkins Jr., Jobs, Jobs, Jobs (Fibs, Fibs, Fibs), WALL 
ST. J., Feb. 25, 2004, A15 (citing the adverse impact on U.S. employment of ìtort lawyersî 
and ìa product liability system that has become a random lottery of wealth distributionî). 
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consumer laws and regulations.  The courts have done 
reasonably well in applying these rules, although the lure of 
deep-pocket defendants and creative advocacy is continually 
tempting for the plaintiffsí bar, and, thus, costly for society.  
Despite these costs, the common law of assignment has provided 
the legal environment and market liquidity needed to fund many 
millions of auto sales (and in a somewhat different legal context, 
many millions of home mortgage transactions). 
It seems unlikely that any system of regulation can 
effectively supplant this common law system.  The apparent 
failures of regulation relating to alleged assignee abuses in the 
real estate industry are indicative of the hurdles that await any 
such effort.103  Efforts to prohibit or micro-regulate common 
practices such as spot delivery, discounts in assignments of 
RISCs,104 and APR splits,105 are no more likely to be successful 
than the efforts under RESPA to regulate yield-spread 
premiums.  In the meantime, any serious efforts to substitute a 
regulatory regime would likely impair the availability of credit to 
low-income vehicle buyers, thereby imposing a potentially 
devastating economic cost.  Ironically, this impact would fall 
disproportionately on the purported beneficiaries (the poor and 
minorities). 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The current American legal environment for consumer credit 
continues a late twentieth century policy compromise, evidenced 
by the enactment of the federal TILA and related laws some 
thirty-five years ago.106  It is a compromise that preserves the 
essential role and principles of the common law (primarily 
contract and tort law) and the UCC as the foundation for 
commercial and consumer transactions, while providing for 
enhanced disclosure of important contract terms under mostly 
federal law and some related state laws. 
Your author was asked recently if he thinks the TILA is a 
failure.107  The answer is clearly no; in some ways it has been a 
 
 103 See, e.g., Robert M. Jaworski, Culpepper: An Epic Battle Continues, 55 
CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 119, 119 (2001); Williams, supra note 64 (describing the 
checkered and frustrating history of RESPA regulation and litigation). 
 104 See Kelley & Ropiequet, supra note 40. 
 105 See Kelley et al., APR Splits, supra note 72.  Efforts to do so through litigation 
are also dubious, since the results (even if successful) would affect only one defendant, 
merely creating a competitive disadvantage for one among many. 
 106 See, e.g., ROHNER & MILLER, supra note 38, at 11-15. 
 107 Apparently due to this published comment: ìThe Truth in Lending Act was 
turned from a tool to achieve more informed use of credit into a weapon to avoid 
repayment of debt.î  Lynne B. Barr et al., Introduction to the 2003 Annual Survey of 
Consumer Financial Services Law: Of Statutory Aging and Process Failure, 58 BUS. LAW. 
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spectacular success.  The APR and Finance Charge calculations 
and disclosures, while not free of controversy, have become near-
universal standards that are widely recognized as a uniform 
statement of the cost of credit, thus allowing effective credit 
comparison shopping for the first time.  In a credit sale, the TILA 
disclosures also prominently disclose the sales price (and in all 
credit transactions, the total of payments, among other things).108  
The system is not perfect or trouble-free, but it makes it difficult 
for any interested consumer to misunderstand the basic terms of 
his or her transaction.  In this way, common law and UCC 
principles and mechanisms, and party-autonomy, have been 
significantly enhanced. 
Of course, it has not come without cost.  The TILA is one of 
the most litigated statutes in history.109  Some of this litigation 
has been frivolous and much of it has been very expensive to the 
industry and ultimately to consumers.110  It is probably no 
coincidence that much consumer credit is more expensive (in 
relative terms) than when the TILA was enacted.111  It would be 
a surprise if it were otherwise.  The TILA has been immensely 
expensive, in terms of both compliance and litigation costs, and 
such costs are inevitably borne by consumers in one way or 
another. 
Due to significantly increasing compliance costs, burdens, 
and litigation, the TILA and similar laws and regulations have 
 
1131, 1132 (2003) (explaining historical events that led to TILA reform in the 1980s). 
 108 See, e.g., Cook, Closed-End Credit Transactions, supra note 89, at 316. 
 109 Neff v. Capital Acquisitions & Mgmt. Co., 352 F.3d 1118 (7th Cir. 2003); Baker 
v. Sunny Chevrolet, Inc., 349 F.3d 862 (6th Cir. 2003); Anders v. Hometown Mortgage 
Servs., Inc., 346 F.3d 1024 (11th Cir. 2003); Pechinski v. Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Assín, 
345 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2003); Roberts v. Fleet Bank (R.I.), 342 F.3d 260 (3d Cir. 2003); 
ROHNER & MILLER, supra note 38, at 10. 
 110 See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin, Legislative Methodology: Some Lessons from the 
Truth-in-Lending Act, 80 GEO. L.J. 233, 237-38 (1991). 
 111 Your author remembers the 1950s and 1960s, when common below-prime 
consumer credit transactions, e.g., to buy or refinance household goods, were often 
available at interest rates of 10% or less.  Today the rate is likely to be twice that, and 
even higher in some instances, at a time when the overall level of interest rates is far 
lower.  Of course, other consumer law protections have also contributed to this increase, 
such as the FTC Rule on Credit Practices, which effectively bars traditional refinancing 
and other nonpurchase money loans secured by household goods.  16 C.F.R. ß 444.2(a)(4) 
(2003).  While the latter rule was legitimately aimed at certain abusive practices, it 
arguably went too far in barring all nonpurchase money loans on household goods, 
thereby cutting off consumers from needed transactions and leaving them with only 
higher cost alternatives.  It illustrates again the point that regulatory solutions tend to 
drive up the cost of consumer credit in various ways.  Cf. U.C.C. ß 9-108(e) (2003) 
(requiring a more specific description of consumer goods collateral in the security 
agreement).  While the U.C.C. approach has not been fully developed (perhaps due to the 
FTC rule), it is a contracts-based approach that could offer more promise than the total 
regulatory ban. 
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also contributed to consolidation in the credit industry.112  
Competition from small local lenders, who are disproportionately 
affected by complex regulatory requirements, has been reduced.  
A manifestation of this is the virtual demise of locally owned 
community banks, thrifts, and finance companies in some areas 
and their replacement by larger out-of-state enterprises.113  Of 
course, other regulatory factors, such as federal banking 
regulation, have also played a role.  But clearly the credit 
industry has been remade in the wake of modern federal 
regulation in ways that are not all beneficial.  The TILA and 
other federal consumer regulations share some of the blame for 
these changes. 
Could the TILA (and the ECOA, FDCPA, etc.) have been 
done differently and better?  Although TILA simplification in the 
1980s shaved off many of the roughest edges, the answer to that 
question is still ìundoubtedly so.î  Clearly the remaining need is 
for more simplification, not more complexity in disclosures or 
more cumbersome regulations.114  The focus should be on more 
effective disclosure (rather than on more disclosure, litigation 
encouragement, penalties for inadvertent and harmless errors, or 
the addition of layers of essentially meaningless requirements).  
It is never too late to reduce the risks and burdens of regulation.  
Continual improvement provides the hope that we can eventually 
get it right. 
Of course, laws and regulations must be a compromise and 
those who do not favor simplicity in the law or freedom of 
contract may not be eager to enhance contract law.  Some 
plaintiffsí lawyers may disfavor legal simplification because it 
reduces the chances of creditor error, and therefore, litigation 
prospects.  Large creditors may not be eager to give up the 
competitive advantages over smaller competitors that come with 
a complex federal regulatory environment.115  And, for obvious 
reasons, regulatory agencies are likely to favor more regulation 
(and regulatory authority) rather than less.  Since these are the 
most politically active and influential among the interested 
parties, regulatory reform is as difficult today as ever. 
 
 112 See, e.g., Alvin C. Harrell, Deposit Insurance Issues and the Implications for the 
Structure of the American Financial System, 18 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 179 (1993) 
(focusing on the impact of banking regulation); Alvin C. Harrell, Penn Square Bankñ20 
Years Later: Introduction to the Symposium, 27 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 945 (2002) 
[hereinafter Harrell, Penn Square Bank]. 
 113 See, e.g., Harrell, Penn Square Bank, supra note 112, at 945. 
 114 See Joseph M. Kolar, Analysis of the Proposed RESPA Rule, 57 CONSUMER FIN. 
L.Q. REP. 10 (2003). 
 115 As the late Robert L. Bartley said in a 1979 Wall Street Journal editorial: ìThe 
business giants . . . always have the option of doing everything left-handed and backward, 
if thatís what the government wants . . . .î  Bartley, supra note 49. 
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The good news is that the common law system largely works 
anyway.  Absent further genuine reform, the best to be hoped for 
is a continuing, sometimes expensive, and painstaking evolution 
of the law in the courts.  This is the common law at work, and in 
the end it appears to be the most effective mechanism for 
developing and keeping up-to-date a modern system of contract-
based consumer law for the twenty-first century.  After hundreds 
of years, because of our common law system, the broad middle 
ground is still holding and is as viable as ever.  Thank you, Lord 
Mansfield. 
 
